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Alternative Entities and Fiduciary Duty Waivers 
in Delaware 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1900s, Delaware has been the preeminent state 
for businesses to incorporate,1 with more than half of the current 
Fortune 500 companies incorporated there.2 With the emergence of 
limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies, 
Delaware has also become the primary formation state for alternative 
entities. The attractiveness of Delaware to corporations and 
alternative entities is due both to the favorable legislation and to the 
competent judiciary found in the state. This is especially true in 
regards to alternative entities, where the legislature has given large 
deference to the freedom of contract between the members or 
partners of these entities. Additionally, the court of chancery’s 
distinct equity jurisdiction has allowed it to specialize in corporate 
law, giving businesses the reassurance that the Delaware judiciary not 
only fully understands complex corporate law issues, but also has 
extensive experience in the practical application of corporate law.3 
One area of debate in Delaware law surrounds the doctrine of 
fiduciary duties in the context of alternative entities. In recent years, 
it has been firmly established that fiduciary duties in alternative 
entity agreements may be modified, and even waived, as long as 
done so expressly. This ability to modify and waive fiduciary duties in 
the alternative entity context has not only brought with it all the 
benefits of freedom of contract, allowing the parties to define exactly 
what standards are applicable in specific situations, but has also 
inherited the downsides of contract law, such as the challenges courts 
face when interpreting ambiguous agreements. As Delaware courts 
 
 1.  LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF 
CORPORATIONS, WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), 
http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  All five of the Chancellors on the court have spent portions of their legal practice at 
firms in Delaware, with a number of them specializing in complex corporate and commercial 
matters. See Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery, DELAWARE STATE COURTS, 
http://courts.delaware.gov/Chancery/judges.stm (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
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have been tasked with interpreting these alternative entity 
agreements, various outcomes have occurred. The result has been 
unpredictability and lack of met expectations regarding when and 
what fiduciary duties will apply. This Comment proposes a solution 
that will increase predictability for the contracting parties while also 
allowing fiduciary duties to play their traditional role of filling gaps 
in incomplete contracts. 
This Comment begins in Part I by laying out the history and 
nature of the two common alternative entities—limited liability 
partnerships and limited liability companies. The nature and history 
of fiduciary duties are then discussed in Part II, with a focus on their 
development in the alternative entity context in Delaware. Parts III 
and IV cover the issues revolving around their waiver, namely 
increased costs to the entity and unpredictability in judicial decisions, 
as well as why current contractual interpretative methods in this 
context are futile. Finally, in Part V, this Comment proposes a 
possible solution—that Delaware courts should narrowly and strictly 
construe the “express” requirement, first determining if a fiduciary 
duty waiver or modifying provision is clear and express, and applying 
default fiduciary duties when there is material ambiguity in the 
contractual provision modifying or waiving the fiduciary duty. This 
solution will be supported by looking at the important nature of 
fiduciary duties in fiduciary relationships and by showing that the 
burden should be placed on the fiduciary, in his role as a fiduciary, to 
explicitly and clearly waive his duties so that all parties are allowed 
predictability in ordering their business affairs. 
I. ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES IN DELAWARE 
Two primary types of alternative entities to the traditional 
American business entity of the corporation exist in Delaware—the 
limited liability company (LLC) and the limited liability partnership 
(LLP). In Delaware, the formation of alternative entities has 
outpaced the formation of corporations.4 In 2011, “non-corporate 
business associations as a percentage of new businesses formed w[as] 
75%.”5 Both entities being relatively new, a primary feature of these 
 
 4.  Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in 
Delaware Non-Corporate Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 94 (2013). 
 5.  Id. 
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alternative business entities is the large allowance for contractual 
freedom. As these alternative entities have become increasingly more 
popular in recent years, there has been an increased focus on the 
legal issues surrounding their establishment, organization, and 
internal conflicts. 
A. Limited Liability Companies 
Limited liability companies were an innovation of the corporate 
world to bridge the gap between the tax benefits of partnerships and 
the limited liability of corporations. LLCs benefit from the pass-
through tax treatment of partnerships while maintaining the benefit 
of the corporation structure where each member and manager enjoys 
limited liability.6 Originally, the LLC revolution began in Wyoming, 
with early LLCs having partnership characteristics in regards to 
entity management, continuity of life, and transferability of 
ownership.7 As IRS classifications began to loosen, however, 
increased flexibility in LLC form began to emerge, birthing one of 
the current primary characteristics of LLCs—freedom of contract.8 
The relationship between the members and managers is 
governed by an operating agreement. In Delaware, the operating 
agreement is dictated by the Delaware LLC act, which grants LLC 
founders great discretion in both the substantive and procedural 
aspects of their operating agreements.9 Because of these and other 
benefits, LLCs have gained great support in Delaware and are often 
the entity of choice. In 2009, there were 70,274 LLCs registered in 
Delaware compared to just 24,955 corporations.10 That number 
increased in 2011 to 93,219 LLCs, with the number of corporations 
in contrast only increasing to 31,472.11 
 
 6.  Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax 
Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
445, 447–48 (2008). 
 7.  Id. at 451. 
 8.  Id. at 453–55, 462. 
 9.  See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18 (2013). 
   10.  DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2011 Annual Report 1 (2011), http://corp.delaware.gov/
2011CorpAR.pdf. 
 11.  Id. 
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B. Limited Liability Partnerships 
As LLCs were beginning to gain steam across the country, 
limited liability partnerships began to develop.12 Originating in 
Texas, LLPs have gained widespread acceptance across the country 
and are currently the primary organizational structure of professional 
firms.13 In its base form, a partnership is essentially just an agreement 
or contract between parties, though one that is fiduciary in nature. A 
distinguishing characteristic of the original form of general 
partnerships is the unlimited liability each partner carries to third 
parties as well as the fiduciary duty each partner owes to the others.14 
The innovation of LLPs came about as a way to reduce member 
partners’ unlimited liability to third parties. In an LLP the partners 
are not personally liable, though they still hold a duty to each 
other.15 Since its creation, the LLP structure has gained large support 
in the business world and in Delaware specifically. In 2009, there 
were 5,488 LP/LPPs in Delaware, growing to 7,287 by 2011.16 
C. Contractual Freedom 
Because both LLPs and LLCs are largely dependent on their 
operating agreements and such operating agreements are permitted 
great leeway in their structure and content under the Delaware LP 
and LLC acts, contractual freedom has played a large role for LLPs 
and LLCs. In reference to the Limited Liability Company Act, the 
Delaware legislature has stated, “[i]t is the policy of [the Limited 
Liability Company Act] to give the maximum effect to the principle 
of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability 
company agreements.”17 The Limited Partnership chapter of the 
Code states the same policy.18 Some have even characterized the LLC 
as “purely a creature of contract,” especially in the context of 
 
 12.  LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 142 (2009). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15 (2013). 
 15.  See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17 (2013). 
 16.  DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., supra note 10, at 1. 
 17.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2013). 
 18.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(b) (2013) (“It is the policy of this chapter to 
give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
partnership agreements.”). 
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fiduciary duty issues.19 Chancellors of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery claim that in their reading of large numbers of operating 
and partnership agreements, “[a] lack of standardization prevails in 
the alternative entity arena,” with drafters taking full advantage of 
the freedom to contract varying characteristic of alternative entities.20 
Although this freedom of contract in the alternative entity arena 
provides a number of benefits for those involved, it can also lead to 
confusion in post hoc interpretation of certain provisions. This 
confusion can be seen in courts’ interpretations of clauses that intend 
to contract around default fiduciary duties. 
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
“A fiduciary relationship is a situation where one person reposes 
special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another or where a 
special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the interests 
of another.”21 Fiduciary duties were originally an invention of 
common law and focus on providing equitable relief. Fiduciary 
duties impose certain duties on one party when that party acts as an 
agent for the interests of another.22 Such principle-agent relationships 
must also carry a level of discretionary power vested in the agent for 
a fiduciary relationship to arise. Such duties arise because of the 
control one party has over the assets or interests of the other.23 
Because there are costs associated with specifying and monitoring 
the fiduciaries’ functions, “[f]iduciary duties are imposed when 
public policy encourages specialization in particular services, such as 
money management or lawyering, and when . . . [those] costs . . . 
threaten to undermine the utility of the relationship to entrustors.”24 
 
 19.  Kleinberger, supra note 7, at 464. 
 20.  Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual 
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Mark J. Loewenstein & Robert W. Hillman eds., 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481039. 
 21.  Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. C.A. 13929, 1995 WL 
409015, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (quoting Cheese Shop Int’l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 
689, 690 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973)). 
 22.  2 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 127–28 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
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Thus, the ultimate goal of the fiduciary doctrine is to provide 
incentives for fiduciary relationships while lowering the risks and 
costs associated with such relationships.25 As defined by the 
Restatement of Agency, “[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty to act 
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the 
agency relationship.”26 In fact, some even hold that fiduciary 
relationships are designed to satisfy solely the needs of the entrustor 
and not the fiduciary.27 Both parties to a fiduciary relationship, 
however, must gain some benefit from the relationship. Thus, it is 
understandable that the parties would attempt to contract for a 
mutually beneficial relationship that satisfies the interests of both the 
fiduciary and the entrustor. 
Fiduciary relationships expose an entrustor to two types of 
wrongdoing—misappropriation and neglect of the asset’s 
management.28 Because of these risks associated with the fiduciary 
relationship, two types of fiduciary duties have arisen: the duty of 
loyalty, which governs misappropriation, and the duty of care, which 
governs negligent mismanagement.29 The Delaware Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act (hereinafter DRULPA) describes the 
elements of the duty of loyalty as: accounting to the partnership and 
holding as trustee any profits, benefits, or partnership opportunities 
that arise from the partnership; refraining from dealing with the 
partnership on behalf of a party that has an adverse interest; and 
refraining from competing with the partnership.30 The duty of care is 
defined by the Act as being “limited to refraining from engaging in 
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a 
knowing violation of law.”31 Simply put, the duty of loyalty concerns 
honesty and the importance of avoiding self-dealing. The duty of 
care, as its name suggests, requires a fiduciary to exercise care over 
what he has been entrusted with, to the point of avoiding gross 
negligence. 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 27.  Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 797–802 (1983). 
 28.  Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-404(b) (2013). 
 31.  Id. § 15-404(c). 
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Fiduciary duties play a large role in business relationships where 
one party exercises control over the property of another, such as 
directors of corporations, managing partners in partnerships, and 
managers of limited liability companies.32 Fiduciary duties create an 
incentive for investors to place their trust in another party, knowing 
that the fiduciary is constrained by the duties legally imposed on 
him.33 Although it could be argued that similar results could be 
accomplished through oversight or contractual bargaining, fiduciary 
duties accomplish the goals without the immense expense and 
difficulty of those other options. The expense of oversight would 
often exceed, or at the very least minimalize, the entrustor’s benefits 
from the relationship.34 Similarly, the cost of contractual creation and 
negotiation can be quite high, especially when attempting to 
contract for every possible scenario.35 Additionally, a well-
documented history of contract litigation shows that no matter the 
ex-ante effort in structuring a contract there are always situations left 
uncovered by the agreement.36 Fiduciary duties “emerged in large 
measure to address the situations involving the exercise of authority 
by one person over another’s property that could not be effectively 
addressed by contracting.”37 It is perhaps for this very reason that 
fiduciary duties are mandatory in the corporate context. Although 
corporations are authorized under the Delaware Code to adopt 
exculpatory provisions relieving directors from monetary liability for 
duty of care breaches,38 equitable remedies must remain. 
Additionally, exculpatory provisions can never apply to the duty of 
 
 32.  Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. C.A. 
13929, 1995 WL 409015, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995)) (“Under Delaware law, ‘[a] fiduciary 
relationship is a situation where one person reposes special trust in and reliance on the 
judgment of another or where a special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the 
interests of another.’ Corporate directors, general partners and trustees are analogous examples 
of those who Delaware law has determined owe a ‘special duty.’”). 
 33.  FRANKEL, supra note 22. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  George M. Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, in 
CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 133 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 5. 
 38.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
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loyalty.39 These restrictions, however, do not apply in the alternative 
entity context. 
A. Fiduciary Duties in the Alternative Entity Context 
The Delaware Legislature has determined that both the duty of 
loyalty and the duty of care may be expanded, restricted, and even 
eliminated in alternative entities through either the partnership or 
operating agreements.40 Often, the interests of contractual freedom 
are forwarded as the primary reason behind this broad allowance in 
alternative entities.41 Initially, this contractual freedom did not 
include the complete elimination of fiduciary duties. In fact, in 2002, 
the Delaware Supreme Court doubted the permissibility of 
eliminating fiduciary duties entirely under DRULPA and emphasized 
that “scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties is normally expected” 
under Delaware jurisprudence.42 Although in 2004 the Delaware 
Legislature amended the Delaware LP and LLC acts to explicitly 
allow the elimination of fiduciary duties through alternative entity 
operating agreements, this negative view of the court towards the 
permissibility of eliminating fiduciary duties shows the important 
role that these duties have played in the business entity context. 
Because of this important role, the chancery court held in 
Auriga Capital v. Gatz Properties (Auriga I) that fiduciary duties are 
default rules for LLCs, unless explicitly waived.43 The court stated 
that “where the core default fiduciary duties have not been 
supplanted by contract, they exist.”44 The chancery court in Auriga I 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2010) (“To the extent that, at law or in 
equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership 
or to another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or 
eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; provided that the partnership 
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.”). 
 41.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
1101(b) (2010) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle of 
freedom of contract.”). 
 42.  Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167 
(Del. 2002). 
  43.  Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 852 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 44.  Id. 
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stated two important reasons for the default overlay of fiduciary 
duties in the LLC context. First, it found that the fiduciary duty 
defaults allow predictability to measure whether a fiduciary has met 
her obligations.45 Second, default fiduciary duties instill confidence 
in investors investing in Delaware LLCs.46 Although the Supreme 
Court of Delaware criticized the chancery court for addressing an 
issue that was not raised by the parties, it upheld the decision on 
contractual grounds in Auriga II.47 However, the view of default 
fiduciary duties under Auriga I was followed by the chancery court 
again in Feeley v. NHAOCG, though this time the issue was 
addressed by the parties.48 Additionally, in 2013 the Delaware 
legislature amended the Delaware Code to make it clear that default 
fiduciary duties do apply to LLCs when they have not been expressly 
contracted away.49 
The chancery court’s reasoning in Auriga I is instructive of the 
court’s views regarding fiduciary duties. Although often regarded as 
creatures of contract, the court was unwilling to find that the 
fiduciary duties did not apply to LLCs unless explicitly contracted 
away.50 In fact, the court found that they were so fundamental that 
they were default rules.51 It is important to note that the reasons for 
the importance of fiduciary duties articulated by the court in Auriga 
I are still relevant. The court’s views that defaults allow predictability 
to measure whether a fiduciary has met her obligations has been 
shown to be an important insight, as the courts’ decisions since have 
shown a lack of predictability in attempting to interpret fiduciary 
duty modification provisions. 
 This great flexibility in contracting the boundaries of when 
fiduciary duties apply has been extensively utilized by alternative 
entities in Delaware. In a study of 85 publicly traded alternative 
entities, “75 (or 88%) either totally waive the fiduciary duties of 
managers or eliminate liability rising from the breach of fiduciary 
 
 45.  Id. at 853. 
 46.  Id. at 854. 
 47.  See Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1214 (Del. 2012). 
 48.  Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 659–63 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 49.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013). 
  50.  Auriga Capital Corp., 40 A.3d at 852. 
  51.  Id. 
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duties.”52 Additionally, looking exclusively at publicly traded 
alternative entities, “47.06% of limited liability companies and 
94.20% of limited partnerships (cumulatively 84.88%) have operating 
agreements with special approval provisions, creating a strong 
presumption that a transaction complies with fiduciary 
requirements.”53 Beyond this, another “29.41% of limited liability 
companies and 57.97% of limited partnerships (cumulatively 52.32%) 
have operating agreements that eliminate fiduciary 
duties altogether.”54 
Although these figures solely represent publicly traded Delaware 
alternative entities, they give an insight into the popularity of such 
fiduciary duty waiving provisions by the drafters of alternative 
entity agreements. 
Despite there being no standardized language for waiving of 
fiduciary duties, there has developed a somewhat commonly used 
pattern. The following is a provision that roughly illustrates the 
pattern the court of chancery has most often seen in LLP 
waiver provisions: 
Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, neither the General 
Partner nor any other Indemnitee shall have any duties or liabilities, 
including fiduciary duties, to the Partnership or any Limited 
Partner or Assignee and the provisions of this Agreement, to the 
extent that they restrict, eliminate or otherwise modify the duties 
and liabilities, including fiduciary duties, of the General Partner or 
any other Indemnitee otherwise existing at law or in equity, are 
agreed by the Partners to replace such other duties and liabilities of 
the General Partner or such other Indemnitee.55 
The provision seeks to replace any traditional duties that would be 
owed to investors with only those that are contractually specified. 
The term “Indemnitee” is meant to cover all potential defendants in 
addition to the General Partner. However, as pointed out by 
Chancellors Strine and Laster, “[t]here are agreements . . . that omit 
particular parties, leaving them exposed to traditional fiduciary duty 
 
 52.  Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: 
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 558 (2012). 
 53.  Horton, supra note 4, at 94 (footnotes omitted). 
 54.  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 55.  Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 15. 
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claims.”56 It is suspected that “these omissions are examples of the 
human errors that inevitably creep in during any lengthy drafting 
assignment.”57 Additionally, there are other agreements that, rather 
than explicitly eliminate fiduciary duties, instead depend on detailed 
contractual provisions to replace the traditional fiduciary duties.58 
The popularity of waiver provisions demonstrates that founders 
of alternative entities believe there are a number of advantages to 
their adoption. However, fiduciary duty waiver provisions have also 
resulted in complications during the post hoc litigation stage. 
III. SUPPORT FOR LIMITING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES 
There are a number of reasons why both principals and agents 
may wish to limit fiduciary duties within alternative entity 
agreements. First, there is a cost the principal must pay for fiduciary 
duties to be applied. Ribstein describes this cost through an example: 
[I]f the fiduciary-to-be believes that there is a 50% chance of 
having to forgo a deal worth $100,000, this represents a $50,000 
opportunity cost (ignoring the time value of money) of becoming a 
fiduciary. The fiduciary-to-be similarly would take into account the 
need to devote time unselfishly to the business. Before making the 
leap to fiduciary status, the fiduciary-to-be would want to be 
assured of being compensated for these sacrifices. The beneficiary, 
in turn, would be willing to compensate the fiduciary for forgoing 
self-advantage only if this would produce an adequate payoff. The 
deal the parties are likely to reach will depend on the costs and 
benefits of fiduciary duties . . . .59 
In other words, the fiduciary would need to be rewarded sufficiently 
to compensate for the lost benefits he would have gained by acting 
in an opportunistic fashion. Consequently, the entrustor would need 
to gain a benefit from the enforcement of the fiduciary duties that 
would outweigh the expense of enforcing them on the fiduciary. By 
waiving certain aspects of fiduciary duties, such as allowing self-
 
  56.  Id. at 16 n.20. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 537, 543 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
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dealing in certain scenarios, the entrustor is not required to 
economically compensate the fiduciary for his lost benefits, thus 
potentially decreasing the cost of the relationship. 
A second potential benefit of waiving or limiting fiduciary duty 
requirements is that it can reduce impediments to the fiduciary’s 
exercise of discretion. “Fiduciary duties arise in relationships in 
which it is in the beneficiary’s interest to delegate open-ended 
decision-making power to the fiduciary. Yet fiduciary duties can 
undermine the main purpose of delegating power to the fiduciary by 
impeding the fiduciary’s exercise of discretion.”60 This can be 
particularly troubling for investors who have invested in the 
alternative entity as part of a diversified portfolio. Such members 
would prefer greater risks be taken by the entity, but by placing the 
risk on a single manager, it may force the fiduciary to act more 
cautiously than would be preferred in a diversified portfolio.61 
Finally, there may be an increased cost in enforcing fiduciary 
duties.62 Assuming for the moment that the presence of fiduciary 
duties would not constrain all opportunistic behavior, it would then 
fall on the principal members of the entity to enforce those duties 
through litigation. If fiduciary duties are clearly and explicitly 
waived, this cost could be avoided. However, as will be discussed 
below, waivers are often not done in a clear enough manner to avoid 
future litigation over what and when fiduciary duties actually apply, 
and thus litigation often occurs regardless. Similarly, this benefit of 
decreased litigation costs would only occur if all fiduciary duties are 
waived. If all fiduciary duties are waived, the only potential litigation 
would revolve around simply whether the default duties apply or not, 
rather than their exact contractually established boundaries. A 
common practice, however, is the modifying or piecemeal adoption 
of fiduciary duties in conjunction with a waiver, rather than a 
complete waiver alone. As a result, increased litigation, rather than 
less, is often the consequence. 
It is clear, therefore, that there are valid reasons why both the 
principal and the agent may wish to waive fiduciary duties in an 
alternative entity. However, as will be discussed in Part IV, there are 
 
 60.  Id. at 549. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 550. 
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complications that arise when alternative entity agreements attempt 
to do more than simply waive the fiduciary duties, but rather attempt 
to apply portions of them in some circumstances while waiving them 
in others. This is further complicated when it is unclear to whom 
such provisions apply. 
IV. ISSUES CAUSED BY WAIVING FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Although the method of completely waiving fiduciary duties uses 
somewhat standard language, complications arise when the parties 
attempt to add back in specific aspects of fiduciary duties in the 
agreement after having explicitly eliminated the applicability of 
fiduciary duties generally or when the waiver of fiduciary duties is 
not done in a clear and express way. The courts’ interpretations of 
the LLC and LLP acts have firmly established the rule that fiduciary 
duty waivers and modifying provisions must be express.63 The 
problem, however, is how narrowly and strictly the court holds the 
drafting parties to this “express” requirement. The question must be 
asked: if the waiving and modifying of fiduciary duties is convoluted 
and ambiguous, but may still be parsed out of the document, is it 
actually express? Or, should the express standard require clear and 
exact wording before it will be honored by the courts? 
The resulting problems caused by ambiguous and convoluted 
fiduciary duty provisions can be broken down into two broad 
categories—increased costs (both ex-ante and ex-post) 
and unpredictability. 
A. Increased Costs 
The waiving of fiduciary duties and then the attempted adding 
back in of specific fiduciary aspects could arguably be increasing, 
rather than protecting against, greater financial expense to alternative 
entities. This increased expense may occur in two ways: ex-ante 
structuring of the partnership or operating agreement and ex-post 
litigation over fiduciary duty issues. 
 
 63.  See In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, C.A. No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *10 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010); Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 
WL 1124451, at *8–11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009); see also Kelly v. Blum, 2010 WL 629850, at 
*11–12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 1010) (noting that contractual alterations of traditional fiduciary 
duties must be explicit). 
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First, in regards to ex-ante structuring, as discussed previously, it 
is quite impossible to contract for every potential occurrence.64 For 
this very reason, fiduciary duties have remained mandatory in the 
corporate context.65 Fiduciary duties fulfill the role of “an equitable 
gap-filler,” going beyond the narrow restrictions of the good faith 
requirement.66 When a party attempts to add back in fiduciary duties 
for potential future situations, the drafter must anticipate not only 
what situations may occur, but also the parties that will be involved. 
This becomes even more difficult when considering the ever-
growing complexity of the business world. With each new year, more 
complex and innovative deals, transactions, and methods are devised 
in corporate practice. Predicting what may be a standard even five 
years from now has become precarious at best. Such detailed 
contracting for every eventuality is impractical. Given the complexity 
and time involved, including legal fees and time spent in negotiating, 
contracting can be prohibitively expensive.67 
Second, in regards to ex-post litigation, there is the potential for 
an increased expense from litigating ambiguous provisions that 
modify fiduciary duties. Because the language often contains some 
ambiguity in regards to the precise facts of the situation and the 
parties covered, petitioners are usually able to draft a complaint that 
will at least get past dismissal.68 Some have recognized a “surface-
level standardization” in these provisions, but quickly point out that 
“this superficial standardization is overwhelmed by diversity in 
implementation . . . creat[ing] fertile opportunities for future 
litigation.”69 Considering that a great deal of provisions that evoke 
some form of fiduciary duty utilize the “gross negligence” language, 
it is usually possible for petitioners to draft a complaint that alleges 
such gross negligence.70 
 
 64.  Cohen, supra note 35. 
 65.  Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 9–12. 
 66.  Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 853 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 67.  Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 12. 
 68.  Id. at 25. 
 69.  Id. at 14. 
 70.  Id. at 25. 
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B. Unpredictability in Judicial Decisions 
More troublesome than the financial cost is the possibility of 
unmet expectations and unpredictability that comes with this 
flexibility in contracting around fiduciary duties. Because of the 
potential ambiguity in these provisions when diversely implemented, 
predicting the results of the court in each situation is difficult to say 
the least. This inability of knowing how the court will rule in specific 
factual situations leaves both the fiduciary and the petitioners with a 
lack of predictability regarding what fiduciary duties will apply. 
Fiduciaries are unclear what their specific duties are under each 
situation, and the petitioners cannot be certain when and how they 
are protected by the default fiduciary duties. Given that freedom of 
contract’s main purpose is to allow parties to determine how certain 
situations will be dealt with, it is ironic that freedom of contract in 
this context creates more unpredictability. 
This problem is best highlighted by the lead in paragraph of the 
opinion in Kahn v. Portnoy: 
Limited liability companies are primarily creatures of contract, and 
the parties have broad discretion to design the company as they see 
fit in an LLC agreement. With this discretion, however, comes the 
risk—for both the parties and this Court—that the resulting LLC 
agreement will be incomplete, unclear, or even incoherent. 
In this case, plaintiff alleges that the director defendants breached 
their fiduciary duties to the company . . . . As the company in this 
case is an LLC, the fiduciary duties of the directors are defined in 
the LLC agreement. This agreement, however, explicitly imports 
and modifies the familiar and well defined fiduciary duties from 
Delaware corporate law. The result is a company whose directors 
are governed by a modified version of the fiduciary duties of 
directors of Delaware corporations. Unfortunately, the agreement 
in this case fails to clearly articulate the contours of these 
contractual fiduciary duties. The result is an LLC agreement that 
provides an ambiguous definition of fiduciary duties and is open to 
more than one reasonable interpretation.71 
 
 71.  Kahn v. Portnoy, 2008 WL 5197164, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
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The result of this ambiguity was the court not being able to hold 
that one position was the only permissible interpretation, and thus 
the court was unable to award a motion to dismiss, leading to 
further litigation.72 This problem is compounded by the fact that 
because of the unique nature of fiduciary duties current contract 
interpretation methods, such as contextualism and textualism, are 
insufficient to resolve potential ambiguities.  
1. Contextualism and textualism are insufficient for resolving 
the ambiguity 
Contract interpretation is one of the least settled and most 
contentious areas of current contract doctrine.73 Two primary polar 
positions of contractual interpretation, namely contextualism and 
textualism, have developed to compete for the center stage in 
contract doctrine. However, both are insufficient for resolving the 
ambiguity in fiduciary duty modifying waivers. Both interpretation 
methods developed out of a need to align contradictory 
interpretations of contractual provisions. But, fiduciary duty waivers 
do not boil down simply to another contractual provision, and thus 
neither contextualism nor textualism can resolve their 
common ambiguities. 
The basic premise behind the two interpretation methods is 
simple. Textualism proposes that contracts and agreements are 
formed between sophisticated parties, who have carefully negotiated 
and understood the terms of the agreement they have entered into. 
Thus, when interpreting provisions of the agreement, the parties 
would prefer that the court look at the carefully drafted language, 
and nothing beyond.74 In opposition to the textualism rationale, 
contextualism recognizes that not all contracts or agreements are 
entered into between sophisticated parties. Rather than carefully 
negotiated wording, often provisions are simply copied from prior 
precedents and offered to the other party as a take-it-or-leave-it 
proposition. Contextualism, therefore, looks at all of the pre- and 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract 
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25 (2014). 
 74.  Robert E. Scott, Text versus Context: The Failure of the Unitary Law of Contract 
Interpretation, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 312, 314 (2013). 
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post-contractual evidence in an attempt to determine what the 
parties intended when they came to a “meeting of the minds.”75 
Each polar end of the interpretation spectrum carries with it its 
own weaknesses. For textualism to truly reflect the intentions of the 
parties, the idea that unsophisticated parties enter into agreements 
must be ignored. On the other hand, contextualism depends on the 
courts’ ability to always parse out the actual intent of the parties, 
even though at least some parties would rather not turn over such 
control to the courts, fearing a substantial risk that the courts will 
erroneously infer the parties’ intent.76 
The weaknesses of contextualism and textualism are incompatible 
with the world of alternative entity agreements, and fiduciary duty 
modifying provisions. Contextualism by its very nature requires the 
court to look beyond the language of the agreement in an attempt 
to infer the parties’ intentions or, in other words, to determine what 
they would have drafted if they were now in the judge’s position. 
However, if there is one thing that is consistent throughout recent 
Delaware decisions on fiduciary duty waivers, it is that the waiver 
must be express.77 Thus, when there is an actual ambiguity regarding 
whether a fiduciary duty applies, the rule laid out by the court itself 
prohibits the court from looking at outside evidence and considering 
the context of the agreement when determining the parties’ intent. 
Unfortunately, the strength of contextualism is the weakness of 
textualism. Where contextualism allows the court to try and 
determine the intents of the parties beyond the simple language of 
the agreement, textualism is bound to the four corners of the 
document. When fiduciary duty waivers are clear, this does not pose 
a problem. The difficulty, however, arises when such provisions are 
convoluted or contradictory. Similarly, textualism’s weaknesses 
become even more prevalent in the context of fiduciary duty 
modifying provisions. A large portion of LLC agreements are not 
negotiated between sophisticated parties, but are drafted by one 
party and offered to investors or other parties as is. Such agreements 
often come in a take-it-or-leave-it package, with fiduciary duty 
waivers being neither negotiated nor often fully understood. 
 
 75.  Id. at 314. 
 76.  Id. at 315. 
 77.  See cases cited supra note 62. 
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Although it is established that both parties have a good faith duty of 
diligence to understand the agreements they enter into, as will be 
shown, often the complete waiving of fiduciary duties and then the 
piecemeal addition of certain duties is convoluted, confusing, and 
contradictory on its face. Thus, a purely textualistic interpretation of 
these agreements does not reflect the intent of the parties and does 
harm to one or both parties. 
An example of the court looking at the plain language within the 
four corners of the agreement can be seen in the court of chancery’s 
holding in Continental Insurance Co. v. Rutledge & Co., where the 
court held that in interpreting provisions to modify a general 
partner’s duty of loyalty, traditional principles of contract 
construction apply.78 In so doing, the court attempted to “distill and 
enforce the reasonable, shared expectations of the parties at the time 
they contracted.”79 In Continental Insurance the court expressed 
that it was not necessary to look beyond the express contractual 
language, holding that it was able to discern the expectations of the 
parties from the clear language of the agreement, since it was not 
overly ambiguous. The court held that the relevant provision did not 
address situations of the general partner engaging in self-dealing 
within the partnership. Thus, the court found that the default 
fiduciary duty of loyalty applied.80 
Unfortunately, more difficulty is often seen in interpreting 
fiduciary duty waiver provisions that are contradictory in nature. As 
the court is confined to the four corners of the agreement, the 
original intent of both parties cannot be sufficiently considered. In 
Bay Center Apartments Owner LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, the 
plaintiffs pled a breach of fiduciary duty.81 Vice Chancellor Strine 
began by acknowledging that under the Delaware LLC Act, there 
was great flexibility in negotiating fiduciary duties, but that absent “a 
contrary provision in the LLC agreement,” the traditional fiduciary 
duties apply to the members of the LLC.82 The defendants in the suit 
claimed that all of the fiduciary duties had been waived, while the 
 
 78.  Continental Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1236 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 1235–36. 
  81.  Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 WL 1124451 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009). 
 82.  Id. at *8. 
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plaintiffs claimed that the traditional fiduciary duties had been 
preserved. To support these views, the parties had cited to two 
separate and, as the court acknowledged, “seemingly contradictory 
provisions of the LLC Agreement.”83 The provisions stated: 
Section 6.1 Relationship of Members. Each Member agrees that, to 
the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware Act and except as 
otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement or any other 
agreement to which the Member is a party: . . . (b) The Members 
shall have the same duties and obligations to each other that members 
of a limited liability company formed under the Delaware Act have to 
each other. 
Section 6.2 Liability of Members. . . . Except for any duties imposed 
by this Agreement . . . each Member shall owe no duty of any kind 
towards the Company or the other Members in performing its 
duties and exercising its rights hereunder or otherwise.84 
As the court acknowledged, the agreement both stated that the 
members of the LLC owed each other the default fiduciary duties, 
but also none other than the kind imposed by the agreement itself. It 
would thus seem that the agreement in the same breath imposed 
traditional fiduciary duties and limited duties only to contractual 
duties, which does not include those defined as fiduciary. To 
overcome this apparent contradiction, the court utilized a textualist 
approach, choosing a particular reading that would not render either 
provision meaningless.85 To do this, the court held that it was 
possible for Section 6.1(b) to be read as “expressly impos[ing] the 
default fiduciary duties,” thus allowing them to be imposed by the 
Agreement and not be included in the duties waived by Section 
6.2.86 The court based this reading on the contractual interpretation 
maxim that, “given ambiguity between potentially conflicting terms, 
a contract should be read so as not to render any 
term meaningless.”87 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. (quoting LLC Agreement §§ 6.1, 6.2 (emphasis added)). 
 85.  Id 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at *9 (quoting Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 
715, 741 (Del. Ch. 2008)). 
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Because of the contradictory language of the provisions, it is 
difficult to determine if the drafters’ intent truly was what the court 
determined it to be. If, perhaps, the drafters did structure the 
agreement to have the exact meaning that the court held, it would 
still seem quite reasonable at the outset for one of the parties to not 
fully understand what fiduciary duties were owed by the fiduciary in 
the agreement. This ambiguity obviously leaves both parties without 
proper notification of their duties or the duties owed them. 
Although the court briefly states that the importance of fiduciary 
duties tipped the scales in favor of their finding, it would seem, given 
the textualist approach to contractual interpretation the court 
employed, that the opposite could also have just as easily occurred. 
When agreements are convoluted, contradictory, and unclear, the 
court’s attempt to apply traditional textualist contractual 
interpretation leaves both parties with unpredictability and unmet 
expectations. An example of this unpredictability is seen in the 
interpretation in Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., where again the 
court was required to determine what fiduciary duties applied in a 
partnership agreement that was not at all clear on its face.88 As 
Chancellor Strine put it in the published opinion, “the drafters took 
a more (shall we say) textured approach” to modifying the default 
fiduciary duties.89 Excerpts of the relevant portions of the 
partnership agreement demonstrate just how confusing these waivers 
can be: 
6.10 Liability of the General Partner. (a) Neither the General 
Partner nor . . . directors [or] officers . . . of the General Partner 
shall be liable . . . for errors in judgment or for any acts or 
omissions taken in good faith. 
. . . .  
6.11 (a) Unless otherwise expressly provided herein, (i) whenever a 
conflict of interest exists or arises between the General Partner or 
any of its Affiliates, on the one hand, and the Partnership, any 
Limited Partner or Any Assignee, on the other hand . . . the 
General Partner shall resolve such conflict of interest, take such 
action or provide such terms considering, in each case, the relative 
 
 88.  Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., 792 A.2d 977 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 89.  Id. at 984. 
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interests of each party to such conflict, agreement, transaction or 
situation and the benefits and burdens relating to such interests, 
any customary or accepted industry practices, and any applicable 
generally accepted accounting practices or principles. In the 
absence of bad faith by the General Partner, the resolution, action 
or terms so made, taken or provided by the General Partner shall 
not constitute a breach of this Agreement. . . . (b) Whenever in this 
Agreement or the Operating Partnership Agreement the General 
Partner is permitted or required to make a decision (i) in its “sole 
discretion” or “discretion,” with “complete discretion” or under a 
grant of similar authority or latitude, the General Partner shall be 
entitled to consider only such interests and factors as it desires and 
shall have no duty or obligation to give any consideration to any 
interest of or factors affecting the Partnership, the Operating 
Partnership, the Limited Partners or the Assignees. . . . Each 
Limited Partner . . . hereby agrees that any standard of care or duty 
imposed in this Agreement, . . . or under the Delaware Act or any 
other applicable law, rule or regulation shall be modified, waived or 
limited in each case as required to permit the General Partner to 
act under this Agreement . . . and to make any decision pursuant to 
the authority prescribed in this Section 6.11(b) so long as such 
action or decision does not constitute gross negligence or willful or 
wanton misconduct and is not reasonably believed by the General 
Partner to be inconsistent with the overall purposes of 
the Partnership.90 
In reference to this agreement’s provisions, the court stated that 
it “ha[s] a head-spinning quality upon first reading.”91 The court 
went even as far as stating that provisions of the agreement were 
“baffling in certain respects.”92 The tone and wording of the court’s 
opinion shows the difficulty the court faced in interpreting an 
alternative entity agreement where a lack of information was present. 
The court implicitly admits to being required to dig deep into the 
language of the agreement, even turning a negatively worded 
Proviso phrase positive to try and glean some plausible 
interpretation.93 Additionally, the court admits that its reading results 
 
 90.  Id. at 984–86 (quoting Partnership Agreement §§ 6.10, 6.11). 
 91.  Id. at 986. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 986–87. 
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in a “harsh” and “rather odd” interpretation.94 It would seem, then, 
that the court held strictly to a textualist contractual interpretation 
method, implicitly acknowledging that at least one party’s 
expectations may not have been met. With a lack of information, it 
can never be certain that the court will come to the same conclusion 
that both parties intended when the agreement was drafted, thus 
potentially leaving at least one party’s expectations unfilled and with 
a lack of predictability in its business affairs. 
There have been times, however, where the court has strictly and 
narrowly construed the rule that fiduciary duty waivers must be 
explicit. In In re Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, the court was faced 
with determining if the following provision applied to 
controlling unitholders: 
[W]henever a potential conflict of interest exists or arises between 
any Affiliate of the Company, on the one hand, and the Company 
or any Group Member, on the other, any resolution or course of 
action by the Board of Directors in respect of such conflict of 
interest shall be permitted and deemed approved by all Members, 
and shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement . . . or of any 
duty existing at law, in equity or otherwise, including any fiduciary 
duty, if the resolution or course of action in respect of such conflict 
of interest is (i) approved by Special Approval, (ii) approved by the 
vote of holders of a majority of the Outstanding Common Units 
(excluding Common Units held by interested parties), (iii) on 
terms no less favorable to the Company than those being generally 
available to or available from unrelated third parties or (iv) fair and 
reasonable to the Company, taking into account the totality of the 
relationships between the parties involved (including other 
transaction that may be particularly favorable to the Company).95 
The court held that it was “especially wary of eliminating 
[fiduciary] duties in the context of a publicly traded limited liability 
company without sufficient evidence within the contractual language 
of the parties’ intent to do so.”96 Thus the court went on to explain 
that the controlling unitholders’ fiduciary duties would not be 
disclaimed unless expressly done so in the previous provision or 
 
 94.  Id. at 986. 
 95.  In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, C.A. No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *6–7 
(Del. Ch. July 20, 2010). 
 96.  Id. at *7. 
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somewhere else in the agreement.97 Although the provision waived 
some fiduciary duties, the court strictly held to the rule requiring 
clear and explicit waivers, and held that “[t]he contractual language 
of [the provision] does not purport to resolve conflicts of interest 
between [controlling] and . . . minority unitholders.”98 
Beyond the weaknesses of textualism and contextualism in the 
context of fiduciary duty waivers, treating provisions dealing with 
fiduciary duty waivers as standard contractual provisions is flawed in 
itself. Neither of these contractual interpretation methods is 
sufficient in the fiduciary duty modification context because, 
although the waiving or modifying of fiduciary duties is done 
through provisions in the partnership or LLC agreement, fiduciary 
duties are not species of implied contract terms. By modifying the 
boundaries of fiduciary duties, the parties are in a sense attempting 
to mutate fiduciary duties into contractual terms, and thus the courts 
face the temptation to approach such provisions as they would other 
contractual provisions. The problem with treating fiduciary duties as 
contractual terms, is that it  
implies that judges should craft particular rules for the parties. 
Often framed in terms of a hypothetical bargain, this approach 
urges judges to choose the result the parties would have chosen 
had they anticipated the situation at issue, but this sort of 
reasoning is quite different from deciding simply whether the 
fiduciary acted appropriately within the scope of her discretion.99  
Contract interpretation is based on the presumption “that the 
parties will act in a mutually self-interested manner” with each party 
being “responsible for securing their interests in dealings with the 
other.”100 In contrast to contractual interpretation, it is assumed in 
fiduciary law “that the parties are interacting for the exclusive benefit 
of one of them—the beneficiary.”101 Thus, by the very nature of 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 
622 (2014). 
 100.  Id. at 622 n.65 (quoting Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL 
L.J. 969, 982 (2013)). 
 101.  Id. 
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fiduciary duties, such provisions demand a different interpretive 
approach than other contractual provisions. 
Because of the nature of fiduciary duties, the established 
requirements for waiving fiduciary duties, and the inherent 
weaknesses in both textualism and contextualism, the current 
framework utilized by the courts in determining which fiduciary 
duties apply leaves parties a lack of predictability in court decisions 
and the possibility of unmet expectations and misconstrued intent. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Courts should narrowly construe the current rule that fiduciary 
duty waivers must be expressly contracted away, requiring that only 
clear and unambiguous waiving or modifying of fiduciary duties will 
be upheld. As has been shown, looking at extrinsic evidence or the 
context of the agreement is inappropriate when precedent requires 
that a waiver be express, and textualism does not have the ability to 
properly protect the intentions of both parties when it treats 
fiduciary duty provisions the same as any other contractual provision. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, fiduciary duty provisions are more than 
a contractual provision and applying the same contractual 
interpretation methodologies does harm to the fiduciary duty 
doctrine. For these reasons, unless a provision that seeks to limit 
fiduciary duties is clear and explicit, the court should find that the 
default duties apply. The relative analysis of the court would thus be 
to determine first if the duties have been modified expressly in a clear 
and explicit way. If they have, the court should uphold the 
agreement, supporting the alternative entity underlying doctrine of 
freedom to contract. However, if the provisions are ambiguous, 
convoluted, or contradictory, the court should find that the 
provisions do not meet the minimum standard of expressly waiving 
or modifying the duties, and thus are unenforceable, with the default 
fiduciary duties being in force. 
Beyond what has already been discussed, this method should be 
adopted by the courts for two reasons. First, fiduciary duties play an 
important role in the business entity environment, and thus when 
there is an ambiguity as to whether they should apply, their benefits 
should support a deference to finding that they exist. Second, 
because the relationship is, at its core, a fiduciary one, and it is 
generally the fiduciary who wishes to waive his duties, the burden 
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should be on the fiduciary to be as clear and explicit as possible when 
waiving those duties. 
A. The Importance of Fiduciary Duties Supports Deference in Holding 
That They Apply 
The importance of fulfilling one’s fiduciary duties in a fiduciary 
relationship was expressed quite vividly in the famous opinion 
penned by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of 
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is 
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not 
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a 
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising 
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating 
erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of 
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden 
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment 
of this court.102 
With such language as “the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive,” it is evident how important some have held fiduciary 
duties to be. Surely, it is difficult to argue that Judge Cardozo would 
hold such duties inapplicable when it is unclear whether an 
ambiguous provision in an agreement may or may not be attempting 
to waive such duties. 
Fiduciary duties are owed when one exercises stewardship over 
the property of another. These relationships are often formed 
through contract. However, over the course of our legal history, 
courts discovered that the contracts themselves were not sufficient to 
protect the parties. Indeed, the court found that fiduciary duties 
were needed to fill the gaps within these special types of contractual 
relationships. As a result, fiduciary duties took an important role in 
both the corporate and partnership worlds. However, as the desire 
 
 102.  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted). 
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for more flexible business entities emerged, so did the need for 
greater contractual freedom. This contractual freedom though, as 
discussed above, has now bled into the fiduciary duties context, 
allowing even the duties that emerged to protect against deficiencies 
in contracts to be contracted themselves and then interpreted in the 
same manner as any other contractual provision. 
Thus, the first reason why deference should be given to finding 
that fiduciary duties apply is that contractual provisions are unable to 
fulfill the same role. Simply because contractual freedom is a 
compelling interest does not mean that it is also sufficient to protect 
the parties involved. The problem with this contractual approach to 
fiduciary duties is clear. Fiduciary duties are meant to be gap fillers 
when an agreement is not explicitly applicable to a certain situation 
or party. But when the provision of the agreement deals with 
fiduciary duties themselves, what is left to fill in the gaps of an 
ambiguous agreement? The answer for other portions of the 
agreement would generally be fiduciary duties, but such a protection 
is not available to fiduciary duty waivers themselves. Thus, when an 
agreement is ambiguous regarding the limiting of fiduciary duties, 
the court should give deference to finding that they apply, rather 
than going through an elaborate exercise of finding some plausible 
interpretation of the provision. 
Contractualists would argue against this stance, contending that 
the freedom of contract allows the parties to determine for 
themselves the level and division of risk they wish to bear. Indeed, 
this country’s economic history is based on the notion of freedom, 
allowing parties to contract for what they will, how they will. 
However, as pointed out by a leading scholar of the economics and 
jurisprudence of contract law, restrictions on contracting may be 
efficient when the market is inefficient, which it often is.103 The 
market can fail in at least two ways—monopolies and imperfect 
information (specifically, buyer misperception of risks, buyer 
misperception of changes in risks, and imperfect 
seller information).104 
 
 103.  Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, THE COASE LECTURE SERIES 1, 3 (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 33, 1995). 
 104.  Id. at 5–18. 
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Additionally, there is fallacy in treating fiduciary duty provisions 
as any other contractual provisions because of the method employed 
in determining if a fiduciary fulfilled his duties. In the fiduciary duty 
context, the judge’s role is to determine if the fiduciary acted 
appropriately within the scope of his discretion.105 However, contract 
provision interpretation is “often framed in the terms of a 
hypothetical bargain,” attempting to determine the result that the 
parties themselves would have chosen if they could have anticipated 
the situation they currently find themselves in.106 
Second, there are also public policy reasons supporting the court 
giving deference to finding that fiduciary duties apply when an 
alternative entity’s agreement is ambiguous on the question. 
Fiduciary duties of loyalty and care incentivize fiduciaries to act in 
the best interest of the entrustor. Fiduciary duties encourage 
honesty, good faith, prudence, and care in the exercise of the 
fiduciary’s duties. Accordingly, ambiguity in the waiver or limiting of 
such duties can reasonably be construed to incentivize the 
opposite—acting in self-interested ways, and exercising fiduciary 
roles with at least some negligence or lack of total care. 
This is not to say that fiduciary duties should be applicable to all 
business entities. There are certainly alternative entities whose 
objectives would be hampered by the enforcement of fiduciary 
duties. Surely it could not be argued that all waiving of fiduciary 
duties is done in a self-interested motivation by the drafters.107 
However, the potential that such provisions will lead to an increase 
in self-interested dealing and lack of care is no logical stretch. 
Although there are surely extralegal constraints that may refrain 
certain opportunistic dealing even without fiduciary duties applied, a 
party’s “potential gains from such behavior often may be large 
enough to swamp such incentives.”108 Therefore, “supported by the 
frequency of cases involving unfair behavior,” it would appear that 
“the benefits of legally enforceable fiduciary-type duties in 
supplementing extralegal incentives may seem to outweigh the 
 
 105.  Smith & Lee, supra note 99. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See supra Part III. 
 108.  Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 234. 
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costs.”109 Although full fiduciary duties may not be desirable in every 
business entity, because of the incentives they create, the court 
should lean towards finding fiduciary duties, rather than not. As one 
has observed: 
The open-ended nature of fiduciary duty reflects the law’s 
longstanding recognition that devious people can smell a loophole 
a mile away. For centuries, the law has assumed that (1) power 
creates opportunities for abuse and (2) the devious creativity of 
those in power may outstrip the prescience of those trying, through 
ex ante contract drafting, to constrain that combination of power 
and creativity. For an attorney to advise a client that the attorney’s 
drafting skills are adequate to take the place of centuries of 
fiduciary doctrine may be an example of chutzpah or hubris 
(or both).110 
Given a situation where an agreement does not explicitly and 
very clearly show that both parties knew and understood the duties 
to be waived, the court should give deference to the finding that 
fiduciary duties, which inherently incentivize fiduciaries to fulfill 
their duties to their best ability, apply. 
Third, due to the nature of the fiduciary relationship, these 
contracts often contain complex tasks that the entrustor cannot 
measure easily on his own, thus making express contracting 
problematic.111 This is especially true when one of the parties is a lay 
person, as is often the case with investors in publicly traded 
alternative entities. The idea of the fiduciary relationship is to have 
the fiduciary do something for the entrustor that the entrustor 
cannot do for herself, so it is improbable to monitor the fiduciary to 
see if he is acting in an appropriate way, especially when the entrustor 
has exposed herself to further liability by entering into an agreement 
in which the fiduciary has waived parts of his fiduciary duties.112 
Thus, a party may not know or understand every possible situation 
or nuance to contract for and being able to contract for every 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: 
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 14.05[4][a][ii] (1994). 
 111.  Cohen, supra note 35. 
 112.  Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1212–
14 (1995). 
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situation is already on its face prohibitively expensive. Add to that 
the many parties that may not be able to account for a majority of 
possible future situations, let alone the more complex, nuanced 
situations that may arise. Shifting such a risk to the entrustor almost 
seems to undermine the fiduciary relationship at its base, leading to a 
mindset that the entrustor should have been able to predict what 
protection she needed before she even knew what needed 
protection. Thus, there are some who characterize fiduciary duties 
“as a hypothetical bargain––that is, contract terms the parties 
themselves would have agreed to in the absence of 
transaction costs.”113 
Finally, both freedom of contract and the concept of textualism 
assume that there is at least some resemblance of equal bargaining 
power. However, while that may be true in some contexts, for many 
others it is a fallacy—many investments, including private equity, 
venture capital, real estate, and hedge funds, are done through 
investment limited partnerships.114 In many of these situations, there 
is no bargaining over the content of the agreements. These are take-
it-or-leave-it investments, where the fiduciary drafts, and thus 
dictates, his own fiduciary duty limits. As Chancellors Strine and 
Laster have observed, “[i]n approaching these entities, investors . . . 
cannot rely on their understandings of default principles of law . . . 
[but] must evaluate entity-specific provisions, ostensibly bargained 
for on an investment-by-investment basis to protect their interests, 
and then practice caveat emptor by foregoing entities whose 
governing instruments are too unfavorable.”115 The Chancellors go 
on to observe that “because bargaining, at best, occurs only 
sometimes, and because it is difficult to participate in certain sectors 
other than through alternative entities, the practical alternatives for a 
skeptical investor are often stark: invest without adequate protection 
against self-dealing or avoid the asset class altogether.”116 Therefore, 
the contractualist argument that fiduciary duty waivers are products 
of bargained for agreements is often not true in today’s publicly 
 
 113.  Ribstein, supra note 59, at 541. 
 114.  Jeffrey E. Horvitz, Fiduciary Duty Waivers of LPs May Expose Sponsors, PENSIONS & 
INV., Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.pionline.com/article/20131014/PRINT/310149994/
fiduciary-duty-waivers-of-lps-may-expose-sponsors. 
 115.  Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 3. 
 116.  Id. at 3–4. 
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traded alternative entity environment. The result, thus, is fiduciaries 
waiving their own fiduciary duties without any bargaining 
between parties.  
B. Fiduciaries Must Be Explicitly Clear in Waiving Their Duties Since, 
by the Very Nature of the Relationship, They Owe Duties to 
the Entrustor 
The rule requiring that fiduciary duties be modified expressly 
should be narrowly and strictly construed, in part because it is often 
the fiduciary himself attempting to limit his duties, thus acting in a 
self-interested manner, rather than for the good of the entrustor:  
In varying degrees the relationships expose entrustors to 
extraordinary risks. Entrustors must entrust power or property to 
the fiduciaries because the fiduciaries could not perform their 
services effectively otherwise, yet this exposes entrustors to the risk 
that the fiduciaries will appropriate the entrusted property or 
interest, or misuse the power entrusted to them. The appropriation 
or abuse of power can result in a loss that far exceeds the potential 
gain from the fiduciaries’ services.117  
Being placed in the role of a fiduciary, the fiduciary must make 
decisions in the best interest of the entrustor. For this reason, the 
courts have “note[d] the historic cautionary approach of the courts 
of Delaware that efforts by a fiduciary to escape a fiduciary duty, 
whether by a corporate director or officer or other type of trustee, 
should be scrutinized searchingly.”118 It is this very relationship of 
trust that requires that a fiduciary waiving his duties not do so 
lightly, but rather clearly and explicitly. If a fiduciary is to lower the 
expectations placed on him by the law, the entrustor has a right to be 
fully aware and knowledgeable regarding the level of protection she 
is afforded. In a sense, when attempting to limit his fiduciary duties, 
a fiduciary must not violate those same fiduciary duties. This is not 
to say that he may not limit his fiduciary duties in his own interest, 
for it would seem nonsensical to argue that that is not often a 
primary motivating reason for such waivers, but he must do so with 
 
 117.  Frankel, supra note 112, at 1212. 
 118.  Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 168 
(Del. 2002). 
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no intent to harm the entrustor. In other words, the waiving of the 
fiduciary duties must be fully understood by both parties, so that 
both the entrustor and the fiduciary know exactly the modified 
nature of their fiduciary relationship. 
For such a high standard of understanding and notice to be met, 
the waiving of the fiduciary duties must be as explicit and clear as 
possible, as the rule implicitly demands. If there is any ambiguity or 
uncertainty regarding whether fiduciary duties apply to certain 
parties or actions, then the courts should find that they by default 
apply, in essence placing the burden firmly on the fiduciary. Thus, 
only in the most express and clear situations will a fiduciary be able 
to waive his duties, leaving those entrustors who in good faith 
believe they are protected to in fact be protected. This proposed 
solution will not only allow for increased notice, but also will 
incentivize more careful drafting of LLC and 
partnership agreements. 
C. Arguments Against not Enforcing Fiduciary Duty Waivers 
There are a number of arguments against not enforcing fiduciary 
duty waivers, or in other words, honoring the waivers even when 
ambiguous. First, to be clear, the proposition of this Comment is not 
that fiduciary duty waivers should not be honored in the alternative 
entity context, but rather that when such waivers are ambiguous in 
the context in which they are being asked to be enforced, that the 
judiciary strictly and narrowly construe the rule that the waivers 
must be express—requiring all waivers and modifying provisions be 
explicit, clear, and unambiguous. If the relevant provisions do not 
meet this standard, then the court should find that the default 
fiduciary duties apply. 
One argument against not upholding fiduciary duty waivers is 
that the ex-post harm to the beneficiary by the fiduciary is the same 
as enforcing any other contract even though one party may feel 
regret because in the end the contract favored one party over the 
other.119 The fundamental problem with this argument is the treating 
of fiduciary duties like any other contractual element or duty. 
Fiduciary duties are more than that. Fiduciary duties exist beyond 
 
 119.  Ribstein, supra note 59, at 551. 
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the contract and stem from the relationship itself. Indeed, the nature 
of fiduciary duties is to fill in the gaps of the contract that creates the 
fiduciary relationship. Thus, comparing the waiving of fiduciary 
duties to any other contractual provision, such as an agreement on 
consideration, is overly simplistic and misses the point of the 
duties themselves. 
Addressing the interpretation issue, some argue that “courts can 
deal with this sort of question, as they have with other interpretation 
issues, on a case-by-case basis.”120 As discussed in detail above, such a 
cavalier approach to ad hoc decision making is not appropriate in the 
fiduciary duty context. Additionally, the interpretative methods of 
fiduciary duties of a necessity require a variation from those of 
traditional contractual provisions. Although the importance of 
freedom of contract cannot be disputed, neither can the importance 
of parties being able to have their expectations realized in the 
context of their fiduciary duties and rights. 
In the end, a great deal of the arguments against not enforcing 
fiduciary duty waivers are based on the principle of freedom of 
contract. Freedom of contract is a primary reason that a number of 
entities organize themselves as LLCs and LLPs in Delaware, and 
thus freedom of contract cannot just be swept aside. However, by 
entering into one of these alternative entities, the parties have 
manifested a desire to be part of a fiduciary relationship, with all of 
the fiduciary duties that come with such a relationship. This 
Comment does not propose that fiduciary duties trump the freedom 
of contract, only that fiduciary duties are of such importance in the 
business world that, if parties are to utilize the freedom of contract 
in the drafting of alternative entity agreements, they must do so with 
heightened precision and clarity so as to ensure that all parties 
involved are fully aware of the fiduciary duties they owe and 
are owed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the popularity and wide acceptance of alternative entities has 
increased, issues surrounding the contractual freedom inherent in 
them have surfaced. In particular, courts have been faced with the 
 
 120.  Id. at 570. 
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difficult task of interpreting fiduciary duty waivers in LLC and 
partnership agreements. Because of the fundamental role that 
fiduciary duties have played in the business law context, as well as the 
important benefits that continue to be realized from their 
recognition, attempts to waive fiduciary duties should be scrutinized 
by the courts. Although the Delaware legislature clearly allows for 
the waiver or modification of these duties, the current rule requires 
that such waivers or modifications be done expressly. The courts 
should narrowly and strictly construe this rule. Unless a provision is 
explicitly clear regarding which fiduciary duties do and do not apply, 
and to whom they apply, the courts should find that default 
traditional duties of loyalty and care are in force. Thus, whenever 
there is material ambiguity regarding fiduciary duty provisions, the 
courts should first determine if the standard of clear and explicit 
modification has been met, and if not, end the interpretation there, 
finding that the default duties apply. This proposed solution will 
promote more careful agreement drafting, decreased litigation costs 
over ambiguous provisions, increased predictability to all parties 
involved, and increased protection for those who believe they 
are protected. 
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